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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
I have the honour to speak on the subject of ‘creating international support for 
the development of the news media in Africa.’ Needless to say, this is a tall 
order. But this is not to suggest that we are completely devoid of suggestions. 
Rather, it is to indicate the enormity of the task of creating any support for the 
development of news-media in Africa. Any talk of developing African media 
institutions is tied up in ideology – a set of strongly held beliefs about what the 
nature and role of the media should be. 
 
This has precedents in history. Take, for example, the promulgation of the 
New Information and Communication Order (NWICO). Africans had long been 
dissatisfied with what they saw as their negative image portrayed in the major 
news agencies of the world (Bourgault 1994: 175). In the late 1970s, 
UNESCO took up the debate on behalf of the Third World. Within the heated 
political context of the time, the Pan-African News Agency (PANA) was 
created by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)2 in 1979. PANA’s aims 
were ‘to rectify the distorted image of Africa created by the international news 
agencies and to let the voice of Africa be heard on the international news 
scene’ (in Bourgault 1994: 175).  
 
The NWICO has since been watered down, largely due to the overbearing 
influence of the USA (Fourie and Oosthuizen 2001:416). In fact, Western 
                                                 
1 This paper was presented at the international conference on Africa’s newsmedia: the vision, 
the need and the responsibility, held in Nairobi, Kenya, from the 7th to the 9th of August, 2006. 
The conference was co-organised by the United Nations-affiliated University for Peace and 
the Nation Media Group, in association with the European Parliamentarians for Africa 
(AWEPA).  
2 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had its name changed to the African Union (AU) in 
July 2002. It consists of 54 independent African states and now has an African Parliament 
headquartered in South Africa.  
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opposition to the ‘group rights’ inherent in NWICO led the USA and Britain to 
withdraw their membership from UNESCO (Traber 1993). We could argue 
that the NWICO was, in part, an attempt at building international support for 
the Third World media. 
 
We might want to go further back in time and ask why it was that Great Britain 
developed a state-supported broadcasting infrastructure in its colonies. The 
answer lies somewhere in the documents prepared by the British Colonial 
Office. In 1949 the desire to take speedy counter measures against the spread 
of communism was reason enough for Great Britain to earmark funds for the 
development of broadcasting services. Communism was seen as a catalyst for 
the rising tide of ‘African nationalism’. Such publishers as Dr. Nandi Azikiwe 
and Dr. Kwame Nkrumah were having their resonance outside Nigeria and 
Ghana. Charles Jeffries, Under Secretary of State in the Colonial Office, was to 
urge the British administration to set aside a substantial sum of money for the 
development of state broadcasting in the colonies (Armour 1984: 362).  
 
The point I wish to underscore is that ideological imperatives -- on both sides -- 
do determine the direction of any international mechanisms instituted to support 
the development of the media in Africa. At the core of this is a potential 
ideological-definitional problem that ‘media development’ will have to contend 
with. Is ‘media development’ defined in terms of strengthening and supporting 
the emergence of highly commercialised media, such as we find in America? 
Or is it going to be defined in terms of evolving and strengthening a strong 
public-service media system, such as we find in most of Europe? Or, indeed, is 
‘media development’ going to be defined in terms of a ‘hybrid’ media system, 
such as we see in Africa?  
 
Why, then, is there this renewed vigour and clamouring for building 
international support for the media in Africa? Has the African media, once 
again, become implicated in some ideological warfare? I believe the reasons 
are more complex than the historical precedents I have referred to.  I believe 
that these very reasons -- to be found in the dynamics of the interface 
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between global and local processes -- present opportunities for creating 
international support for African media development. 
 
2.0 OPPORTUNITIES FOR MEDIA DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 The globalisation of democratisation 
 
The 1990s, following the collapse of state socialism and the consolidation of 
capitalism worldwide, marked a dramatic intensification of public awareness of 
democratisation. This is particularly evident in the way most African systems 
of government changed from authoritarian to liberal forms of democracy. This 
would seem to agree with Hyden and Okigbo (2002) who place the media in 
Africa in what they call ‘the two waves of democracy’. The ‘first wave’ refers to 
the colonial period. In other words, Hyden and Okigbo see the African-
nationalist struggles for independence from colonial rule as an agenda for 
democratisation. This initial wave was effaced soon after independence, 
giving way to a ‘second wave’ of post-colonialism that itself becomes 
implicated in Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘third wave’ (Huntington 1991: 21-25). 
Huntington’s ‘third wave’ -- this global movement towards democratisation – 
became a reality in most of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. Indeed, some 
scholars refer to this process as Africa’s ‘second liberation’ to underscore the 
betrayed hopes surrounding the liberation from colonial rule in the 1950s and 
1960s (Diamond 1999: ix).  
 
Along with the embracing of democratic forms of governance were other 
opportunities in which we can locate the impulses towards creating 
international support for the news-media in Africa. What are these?  
 
2.2 Liberalisation: deregulation of the media landscape 
 
The 1990s saw the unfolding of the process of liberalisation from Nigeria to 
South Africa, with corresponding deregulatory policy and legislative changes. 
The discourse of liberalisation led many countries in Africa to promulgate 
liberal-economic media and information policies. The emergence of a 
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multiplicity of privately owned commercial broadcast and print media channels 
during this period was attributable to this liberalism, which stressed the pre-
eminence of private capital over state capital (Bourgault 1995: 224).  
 
For example, in 1993, the new Zambian government, elected into office in 
1991, passed the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Licensing) 
Regulations to liberalise the broadcasting sector for private investment 
(Banda 2006: 461). The same was true of Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, 
etc. (Banda 2003).  
 
Indeed, in the case of South Africa, the fall of apartheid in 1994 saw South 
Africa embark on an “expansionist-capitalist” agenda (Banda 2003:190) in 
which it liberalised the media market. While there was an in-flow of foreign 
direct investment into the country, there was also an out-flow of media 
investment from South Africa, with Naspers’ MultiChoice Africa championing 
this movement of private media capital (in Banda 2006).   
 
The point to underscore is that there was a rekindling of African private media 
capital, largely as a consequence of the liberal-economic policies adopted 
across Africa, presenting further opportunities to grow media as businesses 
and to inject pluralism into the local media spaces. While this was more 
pronounced in some countries, it was less so in others. 
 
2.3  The privatisation and commercialisation of state media 
 
Along with this political and economic liberalisation was a tendency towards 
the restructuring of the state-owned broadcasting systems inherited from the 
colonialist masters in line with the public-service ethos. In this regard, two 
options presented themselves: privatisation and/or commercialisation. Most 
countries preferred the latter to the former. For example, Zambia opted to 
commercialise its state media system. Privatising the Zambia National 
Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) would entail loss of political control over the 
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airwaves. A related issue here was the setting up of ‘independent’ 
broadcasting regulatory authorities (Banda 2003). In this regard, the Malawi 
Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA), the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA) in Zambia and the Broadcasting Authority of 
Zimbabwe (BAZ) are examples. However, the ‘independence’ of these bodies 
has remained a contested issue, with the intensity of ‘independence’ varying 
from country to country. For example, South Africa’s ICASA is much freer 
than Zimbabwe’s BAZ.  
 
2.4 A communitarian agenda for the democratisation of the media 
 
Communitarian forms of democratisation would emphasise the utopian social 
or ‘community’ potential of democracy. This would seek to privilege a deeper, 
more participatory form of democracy in which communities influence the 
news-media agenda. As an element of democratisation, its popularity in Africa 
occurred at the height of the transnationalisation of civil society in the 1990s. 
For example, the international broadcasting policy campaign of the World 
Association for Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC), headquartered in 
Montréal, legitimated community radio broadcasting as an alternative medium 
distinct from state and commercial broadcasting in Africa. It was such 
transnational networks that carried forth the ideology and practice of 
communitarian communication (Banda 2006: 463-465). 
 
However, the emergence of communitarian forms of media, such as 
community radio broadcasting, was not without its problems. Services were 
concentrated along the line of rail, excluding the majority of the rural poor. The 
programming was more entertainment-based than developmental (Bourgault 
1995: 103; Banda 2003). Other problems included little funding, too few 
volunteers, lack of training, etc. After all, most such community radio initiatives 
were set up with the promise of donor funding in mind.  
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2.5 The re-regulation of the media 
 
Some countries, such as Zimbabwe, experienced a reversal in the 
liberalisation process and re-regulated the media industry through a series of 
heavy policy and legislative measures, something not unknown in 
Huntington’s ‘third wave’. This was also evident, albeit in more subtle ways, in 
several other countries through the harassment of journalists and the 
withdrawal of state advertising from privately owned media institutions.  
 
2.6 Global agenda against terrorism 
 
The overtly ideological aspects of creating international support for the 
development of African news-media may be located in the so-called war on 
terror. As part of this ‘war’, the USA and Britain seek to promote some form of 
democracy in the Arab world, including Africa, in a bid to stem the spread of 
Islamic fundamentalism. Clearly, any such strategy against international terror 
will include some action steps aimed at re-orienting African media institutions 
so that they can become more receptive to liberal ‘democratic’ impulses. This 
ideological agenda, whatever our own idiosyncratic appropriation of it, 
coincides with the other opportunities I have just outlined. The point to 
underscore is that Western funding of any media-development initiative will 
thus be influenced by this ideological positioning.  
 
As a consequence of these opportunities, there is already evidence of an 
emerging international media development movement.  
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3.0 MEDIA DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES 
 
3.1 The African context since 1990 
 
At least within the context of Africa, it would not be far-fetched to argue that 
the beginnings of an international support mechanism for the media is 
traceable to Windhoek, Namibia. In 1991, UNESCO called for a gathering of 
media practitioners and press freedom organisations in Namibia on May 3. 
This conference culminated in the Windhoek Declaration on Promoting an 
Independent and Pluralistic African Press. The Declaration is a significant 
historical document because it set the background for the proclamation by the 
UN General Assembly of May 3 as ‘World Press Freedom Day’ (Barker 
2001:16). The Declaration repudiated state ownership of media institutions 
and justified the doctrine of media liberalisation and privatisation. 
 
Beyond the Windhoek Declaration, there is clear evidence of African 
ideological (if not practical) engagement with the discourse of media 
development in various documents. For example, the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, in Article 9, echoes the rights in Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights has elaborated this in its Declaration of Principles on 
Freedom of Expression in Africa. The declaration is important because it 
elaborates in considerable detail what is meant by freedom of expression. 
This includes a number of other points of particular relevance for the 
development of broadcasting services in Africa, such as (i) the need to 
encourage the development of private broadcasting, (ii) the need to transform 
state or government broadcasters into genuine public broadcasters, and (iii) 
the need for independent broadcasting regulatory bodies. These points are, in 
turn, reinforced by the African Charter on Broadcasting, adopted in 2001 on 
the tenth anniversary of the Windhoek Declaration (Article 19 2006). 
 
Clearly, there is fertile ground for creating international support for media 
development here.  
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3.2 The global context for media development 
 
The establishment of the Commission for Africa (CFA) in early 2004 by the 
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, marked a milestone in British engagement 
with Africa. Although the Commission’s preoccupation was with much more 
than media issues, it was clear that there was some attention paid to the 
potential role of media in the development of the continent. While there is, in 
some quarters, unrelenting criticism of the Commission’s 11 March 2005 
report, my concern with it here is that it ignited much of the debate we are 
having about creating international support for the development of the media 
in Africa.  Out of that have emerged a number of initiatives that are performing 
specific tasks to keep alive the discourse of media development. I shall make 
mention of some of these initiatives, without providing much detail, partly 
because they are just unfolding, and partly because I am not privy to much 
data about them.  
 
3.2.1 The Global Forum for Media Development 
 
The American based Internews, in conjunction with several media-support 
organisations in Europe, Africa, Latin America and Asia, organised the Global 
Forum for Media Development (GFMD) held in Amman, Jordan, towards the 
end of 2005. The gathering was attended by many of the well-established 
media support organisations in Africa, including some media owners and 
practitioners.  
 
One key recommendation emerging from the Amman conference was the 
possible formation of an African Forum for Media Development (GFMD). 
While the principle of a continental forum was generally welcome, at least this 
was evident during the STREAM consultative workshop held in June 2006 in 
Johannesburg, there was some uncertainty about its workability.  
 
The point to underscore is that the GFMD is serving to further animate the 
notion of a global or international support mechanism for media in the Third 
World.   
 9
  
3.2.2 The African Media Development Initiative (AMDI) 
 
 
The AMDI was instigated by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
World Service Trust, in association with three African universities, including 
Rhodes University of South Africa and Amadu Bello University of Nigeria. The 
main activity underpinning the initiative is a research project aimed at (i) 
collecting media statistics in 17 African countries in order to determine what 
changes have occurred in the media landscape between 2000 and 2005; and 
(ii) conducting in-depth interviews with key informants (media owners, 
government officials, NGO leaders, religious authorities, etc.) about their 
perceptions of media development in each of the 17 countries.  
 
To take the example of Zambia, where I have been involved as an AMDI 
researcher, a review of media development initiatives between 2000 and 2005 
reveals the following: 
 
 There is a diversity of media development initiatives in Zambia -- some 
of these are originated and financially supported by the media 
themselves while others are a partnership between media support 
organisations and donors. 
 There is a need for the involvement of multiple actors in any media 
development initiative, as evidenced in the success of a multi-
stakeholder campaign for legislative reforms and the withdrawal of 
value added tax (VAT) on the cover price of newspapers and 
magazines. 
 Media development activities need to have an inbuilt sustainability plan 
in order to have a lasting impact. 
 Donor support needs to have less conditionality and promote the 
recipient’s independence and innovativeness.  
 Culture must be built into any media development initiative for such an 
initiative to have resonance among the beneficiaries. 
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 Commercial interests are increasingly seen as an important part of any 
media development initiative, particularly if they can be persuaded to 
invest in the media sector (Banda 2006). 
 
As findings from across Africa are being integrated, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that the AMDI research project will prove to be an 
invaluable part of any argument for developing the media in Africa.  
 
3.2.3 The STREAM (Strengthening African Media) Consultative Process  
 
Another process underway is the STREAM consultation which emerged with a 
meeting in March 2006 of some experts in Addis Ababa at the invitation of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). This process, like 
the AMDI research, was supported by the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID).  
 
The key recommendation emerging out of that meeting was to ‘root’ the 
consultation process within the different geographic and linguistic regions of 
Africa. To that end, four (4) consultations were planned. The first such 
consultative forum was held in June 2006 in South Africa under the auspices 
of the Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA).  
 
The STREAM process reinforced most of the findings of the AMDI research 
about the arguments for media development. For example, media owners 
were agreed on the centrality of the following issues: 
 
 Africa’s constitutional and legal regimes are generally not supportive of 
media development, although there are signs of change for the better 
in some countries. 
 There is continuing state interest in the performance of private-sector 
media (e.g. the closing down of The Swazi Observer, etc.). 
 There is also advertiser influence on the editorial content of private 
media, with the result that the quality of editorial content stands 
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compromised, in some cases (from both private and state business 
concerns). 
 There is increased competition for the existing small media markets in 
most of the sub-region. 
 There is also increased competition for the available government 
advertising (while this is a growing problem for some countries, such as 
Swaziland, it does not appear to be so for other countries, such as 
Botswana).  
 There is a lack of training for journalists, with the result that reporting of 
specialised issues, such as gender, HIV/AIDS, etc. suffers from a lack 
of depth. 
 There is also a high turn-over of staff, given the fact that the media 
institutions do not generally remunerate them well. 
 There is a tendency towards profit-maximisation by the private-sector 
media.  
 The increasing ‘commercialisation’/’corporatisation’ of state/public 
media is posing undue competition for the private media. 
 There is a transnationalisation of South African media moguls 
throughout Africa, such as MultiChoice Africa, posing a challenge for 
local media (MISA 2006). 
 
4.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
From what I have discussed, it is clear that this is the most propitious moment 
for harnessing international support for media development. The 1990s have 
opened up opportunities for greater engagement with the international 
community, not least because there are democratic impulses evident 
throughout Africa (notwithstanding some reversals in Zimbabwe and some 
conflict-ridden countries). There are clear signs of business opportunities, as 
a consequence of liberalised markets, notwithstanding the distortions within 
those markets. Along with this liberalised environment are signs of pluralism 
in the media landscape, notwithstanding the sustainability problems most 
private media are facing.  
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At the international level, there is an ideological commitment to creating 
‘democratic’ media that can diffuse the threat of international terrorism. This 
ideological commitment seems to be seeping through to Africa, regardless of 
the protestations people may have about the intentions of the originators of 
this anti-terror ideology.  
 
Over and above these opportunities, there is evidence of organic African 
movements which can serve as a fulcrum around which to create further 
international support for the development of the media in Africa. Examples of 
such movements are the Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA), the 
Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), etc. These organisations are 
already part of the unfolding regional and continental media development 
processes.   
 
It seems reasonable, therefore, to recommend the following: 
 
1. Recognise, and give articulation to, the complementarities of the 
unfolding media development initiatives, regardless of who is the initiator; 
2. Coalesce these initiatives, at some point, into an identifiably African-
driven and led media development initiative;  
3. Establish a partnership with any global media development initiative, 
without, however, sacrificing the ‘individuality’ of the African initiative; and 
4. Build a truly global media development initiative that can mobilise 
financial and other resources to contribute towards resolving some of the 
challenges facing the media in Africa. 
 
I know these recommendations are general, but they map out the parametres 
within which to create an international support mechanism for developing the 
media in Africa. 
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